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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jonathan George Plaster, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered 
following the district court's order summarily dismissing his successive post-
conviction petition. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In Cassia County Case No. CR-2008-249, Plaster was charged with, and 
pied guilty to, seven counts of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen years of age. (See R., p.96.) The court imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of 40 years with 20 years fixed for the lewd conduct charges 
and a concurrent 25-year sentence with 20 years fixed for the sexual abuse 
charge. (See R., pp.96-97.) Plaster appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed. (See R., p.97.) The Remittitur in Plaster's direct appeal issued on 
October 4, 2010. (See R., p.97.) 
On May 24, 2011, Plaster filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in 
Cassia County Case No. CV-2011-525. (See R., p.97.) The district court 
summarily dismissed Plaster's post-conviction petition and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed "[i]n an unpublished opinion dated July 10, 2013." (See R., 
p.97.) 
On September 5, 2013, Plaster filed a successive petition for post-
conviction relief, raising 26 claims. (R., pp.7-55.) Plaster explained his 
successive petition was "filed due to the fact that [his] Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief was denied and there was no transcript provided/permitted." 
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(R., p.7.) Plaster did not request the appointment of counsel to assist him in 
pursuing his successive petition. 1 (See generally R.; see also R., p.97 (court 
noting Plaster "did not request the appointment of counsel to represent him").) 
The state filed an answer (R., pp.74-77), and the district court issued a 
notice of intent to dismiss ("Notice") (R., pp.96-101). In its Notice, the court 
advised Plaster it intended to dismiss his successive petition because the 
petition was not timely filed. (R., p.98.) The court also notified Plaster that any 
claims based on the proceedings in his initial post-conviction action were not 
cognizable. (R., pp.100-101.) Plaster filed a response to the Court's Notice (R., 
pp.103-108), after which the district court entered an order dismissing Plaster's 
successive petition (R., pp.109-113). Plaster filed a timely notice of appeal from 
the judgment. (R., pp.115-120.) 
1 Plaster did, however, request the appointment of counsel to assist him on 
appeal. (R., pp.121-124.) The district court granted this request (R., p.132), but 
appellate counsel was allowed to withdraw after Plaster asked to proceed prose 
(Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel and Leave to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, filed July 15, 2014; Order Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw and 
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated August 8, 2014). 
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ISSUE 
Plaster's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as 
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). The state phrases the issue as: 
Has Plaster failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaster Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely 
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Plaster filed his successive petition for post-conviction more than one year 
after his conviction became final. (R., p.7; see p.97.) The district court 
concluded that Plaster's successive petition should be dismissed because it was 
untimely. (R., pp.96-101, 109-113.) On appeal, Plaster claims the district court 
erred in dismissing his petition based on timeliness because, he asserts, he has 
a "sufficient reason" for filing his untimely successive petition and that his 
successive petition relates back to the date he filed is original petition. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Plaster's claim fails because he has failed to articulate 
any legitimate basis from which the district court could find his petition was timely 
filed. Plaster has therefore failed to show the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court freely reviews the district court's application of the statute of 
limitation to a post-conviction petition. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 
177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 
836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaster's Successive Petition As 
Untimely 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." The 
failure to file a timely post-conviction petition is a basis for dismissal. Schwartz, 
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (citing Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,959, 88 
P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003)). In the case of successive petitions, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would 
preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not known to the 
defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues."' 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). Absent a 
showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to 
file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the 
petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001 ); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Plaster did not file his successive post-conviction petition until September 
5, 2013 (R., p.7), nearly three years after the October 4, 2010 Remittitur issued 
in his direct appeal (see R., p.97). Plaster's successive petition was, therefore, 
clearly untimely based on the one-year statute of limitation. Plaster does not 
dispute this conclusion, but claims he has a "sufficient reason" for filing a 
5 
successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908 and that his successive petition relates 
back to the date of his original petition. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Plaster's 
arguments fail. 
Plaster's reliance on the sufficient reason standard for filing a successive 
petition under I.C. § 19-4908 is misplaced because it does not resolve the 
question of whether Plaster's successive petition was timely filed. That Plaster 
believes he has a sufficient reason that would allow him to file a successive 
petition does not mean he timely filed his successive petition. While a petitioner 
may have a legally sufficient reason for filing a successive petition, the petition 
must still be timely. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-905, 174 P.3d at 874-875. 
The relevant inquiry in deciding if Plaster's successive petition was timely filed 
requires consideration of whether Plaster filed his successive petition within a 
reasonable time of when the claims raised in the petition were known or 
reasonably could have been known. kl at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. What 
constitutes a reasonable time is analyzed on a "case-by-case basis." kl 
Plaster characterizes the claims in his successive petition as "nearly 
mirror[ing] those" raised in the amended petition he filed in his first post-
conviction case. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Thus, Plaster's successive petition 
claims were known during his first post-conviction proceedings, which forecloses 
any assertion that he is not bound by the one-year limitation period set forth in 
I.C. § 19-4902(a). Plaster's reliance on the relation back doctrine is consistent 
with this point, although Plaster is not entitled to relate the filing date of his 
successive petition back to the date he attempted to amend his initial petition. 
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In Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
Court of Appeals applied the relation back theory to allow the petitioner to timely 
file a successive petition to litigate claims that were inadequately raised in the 
initial petition because post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The continuing 
viability of Hernandez in terms of application of the relation back doctrine is, 
however, questionable in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014), in which the 
Court foreclosed the possibility that ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel can qualify as a sufficient reason "under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a 
successive petition." 
Even if the relation back theory as applied in Hernandez is still viable, it 
would not benefit Plaster in this case because the claims he raised in the 
amended petition he filed in his first post-conviction action that he attempts to 
reassert in his successive petition were not dismissed due to any alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, the claims were never considered 
because Plaster was never given leave to amend his initial petition. (See R., 
p.110; #40193 R. 2, pp.142-143.) To the extent Plaster believes the district court 
erred in not considering the claims he alleged in the amended petition he filed in 
his first post-conviction case, he should have raised that claim on the appeal 
from the court's summary dismissal order; he did not. See Plaster v. State, 
Docket No. 40193, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 576 (Idaho App. July 10, 
2 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to take judicial notice 
of the Clerk's Record prepared in relation to Plaster's first post-conviction appeal, 
Plaster v. State, Docket No. 40193. 
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2013) (appeal from district court order summarily dismissing first post-conviction 
petition, challenging district court's denial of discovery requests). The district 
court's failure to consider the claims in Plaster's amended petition, filed in his 
first post-conviction case, does not justify application of the relation back doctrine 
with respect to his successive petition. 
Applying the reasonable time standard to the timing of Plaster's 
successive petition (as opposed to the relation back doctrine), as required by 
Charboneau, Plaster did not file his successive petition within a reasonable time 
of learning that the claims he alleges in his successive petition were not 
considered in his original post-conviction case. The district court summarily 
dismissed Plaster's first post-conviction petition on June 7, 2012. (#40193 R., 
pp.141-151.) Plaster did not file his successive petition until more than 14 
months later. (R., p.7 (successive petition filed September 5, 2013).) Fourteen 
months is not a reasonable time. Compare Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 
P.3d at 875 (holding that 13 months "is simply too long a period of time to be 
reasonable"). 
Plaster has failed to establish he is entitled to application of the relation 
back doctrine or that he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. 
Plaster has therefore failed to show the district court erred in dismissing his 
successive petition as untimely. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Plaster's untimely successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
DATED this 3rd day of February 2015. 
Depu 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of February 2015 I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
JONATHON GEORGE PLASTER, JR. 
IDOC #81349 
PO Box 14 - Unit 16 
Boise, ID 83707 
10 

